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This thesis aims to assess whether fossil fuel divestment announcements of institutions have 
a financial impact on the energy transition, by utilizing event study methodology to measure 
abnormal returns and trading volume of the top hundred global fossil fuel and renewable 
energy stocks with the highest market capitalization at the date of fossil fuel divestment 
announcements from 2014 through 2019.  
While our findings do not yield significant abnormal returns for fossil fuel stocks for the 
sample from 2014 through 2019, we do find significant abnormal returns in events prior to 
2016, suggesting that investors reacted to announcements in the earlier years of the divestment 
movement and do not find the recent announcements to provide significantly new information. 
We do not find significant abnormal returns for renewable energy stocks, both during the 
sample from 2014 through 2019, and in the sample prior to 2016. 
In terms of trading volume, the findings yield significant cumulative average abnormal volume 
(CAAV) for both fossil fuel and renewable energy stocks during the event windows, which 
are defined as a subset of days before, after, and on the announcement day (day zero). Fossil 
fuel stocks experience positive CAAV during the short [0:3 days], long [0:10 days], and full 
event windows [-3:10 days], and renewable energy stocks experience negative CAAV during 
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Over the past decade, growing awareness around climate change and the environmental 
impacts of the fossil fuel industry have sparked a shift to renewable energy and a divestment 
campaign against fossil fuels, resulting in financial and educational institutions, governments 
and other entities committing to divest. The importance of this transition has been recognized 
at an international level, and in 2021 the UN Secretary-General stated: “To achieve net zero 
emissions by 2050, we need an urgent transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy,” and 
requested a strong commitment from all governments to end fossil fuel subsidies and 
construction of coal-fired power plants (UN, 2021). This request was followed shortly by the 
International Energy Agency’s 2021 roadmap to net zero emissions by 2050 report, which 
recommended no new investment in new fossil fuel supply projects starting immediately (IEA, 
2021). This report prompted international debate, with Japan and Australia indicating they will 
continue investing in fossil fuel regardless, and two of Norway’s political parties expressing 
skepticism over the findings (Financial Times, 2021). 
This transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy is reflected in financial markets. In 2020, 
investment in the energy transition1 reached $501 billion, an increase of 113% from 2010 
(Bloomberg, 2021). New investment in renewable energy made up a significant portion of this 
growth, with a global increase of 44% over the same period (Bloomberg, 2021). Additionally, 
the MSCI World ex Fossil Fuels Index, which eliminates exposure to fossil fuel reserves, 
outperformed the MSCI World Index in eight out of ten years from 2011 through 2020 (MSCI, 
2021), and a 2020 study found that renewable power stocks were less volatile and provided 
higher returns than fossil fuels (IEA and CCFI, 2020), even outperforming oil in 20202 despite 
the COVID-19 pandemic (Bloomberg, 2021).  
Although the fossil fuel divestment movement is widely supported as a driver of change, some 
argue that divestment has little to no effect on fossil fuel stocks and recommend a strategy of 
active engagement and new investment in clean energy instead. This paper contributes to this 
debate by examining whether fossil fuel divestment has a financial impact on the energy 
 
1 Investment in the energy transition includes investment in renewable energy, hydrogen, carbon capture and storage (CCS), 
energy storage, electrified transport, and electrified heat (Bloomberg, 2021). 
2 Clean energy shares measured by the WilderHill New Energy Global Innovation Index (NEX) gained 142% in 2020, while 





transition, by utilizing event study methodology to measure abnormal returns and trading 
volume of the top hundred global fossil fuel and renewable energy stocks with the highest 
market capitalization at the date of divestment announcements from 2014 through 2019. Based 
on the efficient market hypothesis, the public divestment announcements should be 
incorporated in stock prices within days of announcements, and we expect to find abnormal 
returns and trading volume within the event study window. 
Existing studies have measured the impact of divestment on the fossil fuel industry, such as a 
study by Dordi (2016) which measures abnormal returns of fossil fuel stocks in relation to 
divestment related events, and a paper by Cojoianu et al (2020) which measures the effect of 
fossil fuel divestment commitments on the flow of capital into the oil and gas sector. However, 
there is limited research on the spillover effects that fossil fuel divestment may have on the 
renewable energy industry. In the case of fossil fuel divestment announcements, the spillover 
effect could be triggered by information spillover and portfolio rebalancing, and we are 
therefore interested in expanding the study to include the renewable energy stocks. 
We also identify a lack of existing literature on the impacts of fossil fuel divestment 
announcements on trading volume. Based on Karpoff’s (1986) theory of trading volume and 
Beaver’s (1968) definitions of informational content, if a divestment announcement has 
informational content, it could have the potential to change investor expectations and actions, 
which could then affect trading volume. This paper therefore aims to expand upon existing 
literature and fill in the gaps around spillover to renewable energy as well as potential 
abnormal trading volume around divestment announcement events. 
In this study, the analysis on abnormal returns finds that there are no statistically significant 
abnormal returns for fossil fuel or renewable energy stocks around fossil fuel divestment 
announcements. This result differs from the findings by Dordi (2016), who finds statistically 
significant abnormal returns for the fossil fuel industry in relation to fossil fuel divestment 
related events. However, this difference can be explained by the differences in event type, time 
range, event selection, and the sample of stocks used in the studies. Many of the significant 
results in the 2016 study are divestment campaigns or endorsements, whereas this study only 
considers the divestment announcements of institutions and excludes endorsements and 
campaigns. This suggests that the campaign and endorsements, or the global divestment 
movement itself, could be the drivers of the negative impacts on the fossil fuel industry rather 





We further conduct robustness checks to identify the differences in results, which find that 
conducting the analysis on events that occur prior to 2016 as done by Dordi (2016) does in 
fact yield significant negative returns for fossil fuel stocks. This change in significance over 
time can be interpreted through signaling theory, which could suggest that the first few years 
of the divestment movement provided new information and served as a signal to investors who 
adjusted their portfolios accordingly, and therefore did not react as significantly to the events 
in later years. However, conducting the analysis on events prior to 2016 still does not yield 
significant results for renewable energy stocks, and we still do not find spillover effects on the 
renewable energy industry. 
In contrast to abnormal returns, we find significant cumulative average abnormal trading 
volumes for both fossil fuel and renewable energy stocks during event windows, which are 
defined as a subset of days before, on and after the announcement day, which we consider as 
day zero. Fossil fuel stocks experience positive cumulative abnormal trading volume in the 
short [0:3 days], long [0:10 days], and full [-3:10 days] event windows, with statistical 
significance at the 5% level in the short window and at the 1% level in the long and full 
windows. Renewable energy stocks, however, experience negative cumulative average 
abnormal trading volume during the long and full windows, with statistical significance at the 
1% level. The difference in significance between abnormal returns and abnormal trading 
volume could be explained by Beaver (1968), which suggests that there are heterogeneous risk 
preferences among investors, resulting in just a subset of investors finding the information in 
divestment announcements to be valuable enough to adjust their portfolios. 
The structure of this paper begins with an overview of theoretical framework, including an 
introduction to the discourse around the divestment movement itself. This is followed by the 
presentation of our hypotheses, an explanation of event study methodology and the model and 
methods used in this analysis, and the process of event selection and data collection. The next 
section presents the empirical findings and results, along with our interpretation of results and 
robustness checks. Finally, we present the conclusion, as well as the limitations of this paper 






2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Divestment as a form of activism 
The action of divestment aims to create change by withdrawing capital from companies or 
industries engaged in certain activities (Ansar and Caldecott, 2016), and in the past divestment 
campaigns have targeted industries such as tobacco, munitions, adult services, gambling, and 
South Africa during the apartheid (Ansar and Caldecott, 2016).  
The divestment campaign against South Africa’s apartheid began in the 1970s, leading pension 
funds, churches, and university endowments such as Harvard’s to divest from banks and 
companies connected to South Africa (Teoh, 1999). However, a 1999 study found that despite 
this campaign, the valuation of US firms with South African operations were not significantly 
affected by pension fund divestment, shareholder pressure or legislative sanctions (Teoh et al., 
1999). 
Another campaign launched in 1987 against tobacco, targeting academic institutions, 
legislatures and investment boards, and eventually led to Harvard University’s divestment of 
almost $58 million USD in 1990 (Teoh et al., 1999). The movement was pushed by ethics and 
social policy, but also by doubts in the fiscal policy of investing in tobacco as the industry 
faced increasing regulation (Wander, 2007), similar to the case for fossil fuel divestment 
today. This socially responsible investment movement was identified as a contributing factor 
to the weakening share prices of tobacco stocks (Wander, 2007). 
The fossil fuel divestment campaign emerged in 2008, led by the US NGO 350.org. It grew 
faster and wider than other divestment campaigns (Ansar and Caldecott, 2016), and by 2021 
350.org listed 1,312 institutions committed to divest, with a total value of over $14.56 trillion 
USD (Fossil Free, n.d.). Notable divestments include the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 
Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global, New York City, and the Republic of Ireland, 






2.2 Divestment versus engagement 
While the fossil fuel divestment movement is widely praised as a catalyst for change, some 
prominent investors are skeptical to its effectiveness. In 2019, Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates 
was quoted saying: “Divestment, to date, probably has reduced about zero tonnes of emissions. 
It’s not like you’ve capital-starved [the] people making steel and gasoline. I don’t know the 
mechanism of action where divestment [keeps] emissions [from] going up every year” 
(Edgecliffe-Johnson and Nauman, 2019). Rather than divest, he argues, investors should 
instead fund innovations that reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Edgecliffe-Johnson and 
Nauman, 2019).  
Similarly, Bill McNabb, the 2016 chief executive of asset manager Vanguard, criticized the 
fossil fuel divestment movement by saying it would “take something that was public and 
transparent and make it private and opaque, and a wealth creation vehicle for a small group of 
individuals” (Foley, 2016). He stated that considering there was no impact to the income or 
balance sheet of the company facing divestment, it is more effective to continue investing and 
engage with the company as a shareholder (Foley, 2016). 
This perspective is supported by a report by the European Council on Foreign Relations, which 
suggests that divestment from fossil fuels is likely to have only a limited effect on equity or 
debt, and that even the maximum possible divestment from university endowments and public 
pension funds is unlikely to have a major effect on stock prices (Ansar and Caldecott, 2016). 
The findings also suggest that although coal-related firms listed on major stock exchanges 
appear to be affected, the direct impact on the oil and gas sector is likely minor, as alternative 
investors are easy to find (Ansar and Caldecott, 2016).  
Furthermore, a Temple University study supports the case for investment and engagement, 
finding that after successful corporate social responsibility engagements on environmental and 
social issues, there was an improvement in accounting performance and governance of the 
companies that were engaged (Dimson et al., 2015). The probability of the success of the 
engagements increases if the firm engaged has reputational concerns (Dimson et al., 2015), 
which is relevant for the fossil fuel companies facing reputational risks as public awareness 






Another issue with fossil fuel divestment is that even if institutions commit, there is no 
guarantee that all capital will be divested. For example, BlackRock announced divestment 
from coal in January 2020, but only from companies with over 25% of revenue from thermal 
coal, and did not divest if clients did not explicitly choose to exclude coal. This strategy meant 
that even a year after committing to divest, BlackRock still held USD $85bn in coal companies 
(Jolly, 2021). 
On the other hand, the argument in favor of divestment can be supported by its effect on the 
coal industry, which is less liquid with fewer traders and higher transaction costs (Ansar and 
Caldecott, 2016). A 2016 study found that the share prices of coal companies fell significantly 
since the announcement of divestments, with the Dow Jones Total Market Coal Sector Index 
down 76% from 2010 to 2015, compared to the 69% growth in the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average. Findings also showed that the campaign is likely to have led to more accurate pricing 
of climate risk (Ansar and Caldecott, 2016). Reputational risk is a type of transitional climate 
risk, so the potential for being boycotted and receiving unfavorable media attention could be 
incorporated into investment decisions. 
Beyond the financial perspective, activists argue that the campaign creates change by 
removing the “social license to operate” (Edgecliffe-Johnson and Nauman, 2019). This 
sentiment has been echoed by investors such as the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, which was 
originally established with revenue from oil but has since committed to divest from fossil 
fuels. Justin Rockefeller of the fund addressed this in 2016, acknowledging that although the 











2.3 Efficient Market Hypothesis 
The primary role of capital markets is the allocation of funds. To ensure that capital flows to 
where it can create the most value, it is important that market prices of securities reflect all 
information available about the value of the security. Fama (1970) defines a market where 
prices fully reflect all available information as an efficient market, entailing that whenever 
new information that is relevant for the security prices arises, it should quickly and correctly 
be incorporated in the price. Therefore, no trading strategies based on already available 
information can be used to obtain excess returns as this information should already be 
incorporated in the price. The efficient market hypothesis relies on three assumptions. First, 
markets are liquid and there are no transaction costs. Second, information is available and free 
for market participants. Third, market participants interpret new information similarly and act 
rationally.  
Fama (1970) distinguishes between three forms of market efficiency. The weak form of market 
efficiency solely incorporates information about historical prices and returns. This means that 
trading strategies such as technical analysis where one looks at price patterns cannot yield 
excess returns. The weak form of efficiency builds on the random walk literature, where a 
series of prices change randomly from previous prices. The logic behind the theory is that if 
information is immediately reflected in stock prices, tomorrow’s news will only be reflected 
in tomorrow’s price changes and will be independent of today’s price changes. By definition, 
news is unpredictable, and thus, price changes must also be random and unpredictable 
(Malkiel, 2003). 
Semi-strong form of market efficiency also incorporates other information that might be 
relevant for the price of a security such as earnings announcements, stock splits, and other 
relevant information found in annual reports. The strongest form of market efficiency is 
concerned with whether certain individuals have monopolistic access to information that is 
relevant for the price of a security but not available to the public (Fama, 1970). 
As divestment announcements are public information, this study assumes that markets are 
efficient in the semi-strong form. If investors value the information embedded in these 
announcements, it should, according to the efficient market hypothesis, be incorporated in 





the divestments before the announcement and choose to trade on this information, there could 
be abnormal returns prior to the announcement. 
2.4 Information asymmetry and Signaling Theory 
Spence (1973) was the first to introduce signaling theory and used the labor market to explain 
the theory in his original formulation. In a hiring process, the employer knows less about the 
quality of the candidate than the candidate in question. Therefore, candidates obtain education 
to reduce information asymmetries and signal their quality to potential employers. Stiglitz 
(2002) defines information asymmetries as a situation in which two parties have different 
levels of knowledge. In financial markets most information is available for the public, but 
some information is only available for a subset of investors. When this is the case, information 
asymmetries arise.    
According to Stiglitz (2000), there are two types of information where asymmetries play an 
important part:  
1. Information about quality, and  
2. Information about intent.  
In divestment announcements, quality could refer to the ability of the signaler (the divesting 
fund) to reach out to the public with their news, and the signaler’s ability to fulfill the needs 
of the receiver of the signal. In this setting, the second type of information asymmetries can 
be split in two. First, the funds signal their view on fossil fuel stocks and their stand in the 
energy transition. Second, it could also be viewed as a way of lowering information 
asymmetries in the way of releasing information about the excluded firm’s behavior. 
Furthermore, for a signal to be effective it needs to be observable, so the public must be able 
to observe the signal that the funds are sending. If it is not observed by the public, the signal 






2.5 A theory of Trading Volume 
Karpoff (1986) based his theory of trading volume on the idea that investors are heterogenous, 
and that they idiosyncratically and periodically revise their demand prices. Information affects 
trading volume in two distinct ways and the theory provides a rationale for whether one can 
infer that an event contains information valued by investors.  
Before explaining Karpoff’s theory further, a definition of informational content will be 
provided. Beaver (1968) provides two definitions of informational content: 
1. The information provided changes the expectations of the outcome of an event. 
2. The information provided changes the expectations, and the change in expectations are 
large enough to change the decision-maker’s actions. 
By the first definition, a divestment announcement has informational content if it changes 
investor’s beliefs of the probability distributions of future returns. In turn, this leads to a 
change in the equilibrium value of the current market price. By the second definition, a 
divestment announcement has informational content if it leads to changes in the holdings of a 
stock in an investor’s portfolio. This change can happen through selling parts, or the entire 
portion of shares held or by buying more shares of the firm in question. Thus, both in the event 
of “good” and “bad” information, it is likely that the trading volume around these events will 
differ from normal trading volumes. 
Going back to Karpoff, information affects trading volume in two different ways. Abnormally 
high trading volumes can arise from heterogeneous reactions amongst investors. However, 
this does not necessarily mean that investors disagree on how to interpret the information. It 
can reflect consensus amongst investors about the new information if their initial beliefs were 
different. Furthermore, new information can affect trading volume both positively and 
negatively. First, if the new demand price of potential buyers (non-owners) exceeds the new 
demand price of potential sellers (current owners), trading volume is expected to increase. 
Second, if the new demand price of potential buyers is lower than that of the potential sellers, 
trading volume is expected to decrease as a result of the new information (Karpoff, 1986).  
Research on this area has shown that the abnormal trading volume related to an event are 





investors receive the information at the same time. This implies that some investors adjust 
their portfolios based on “old news”. Second, certain investors might not be able to buy or sell 
as much as they want initially and must do their trades gradually. This could be explained by 
transaction costs or limits on size of trades. Finally, investors are affected by uncertainty and 
make mistakes, which are then corrected at a later time (Karpoff, 1986). 
2.6 Alternative theories explaining abnormal returns and 
volume 
In addition to the three main theories presented above, the following section will introduce 
theories and hypotheses that can help to explain abnormal returns and trading volume around 
the announcement date.  
Sustainability and the Cost of Capital 
According to the dividend discount model, the stock price is equal to future dividends, 
discounted at an appropriate discount rate to reflect the risk of the dividends. Research shows 
that firms with significant environmental concerns pay a higher credit spread on their loans 
than those firms that have policies in place to mitigate environmental risk. It is also shown that 
firms that operate more sustainably in the environmental dimension have a lower cost of equity 
through a reduced beta (Clark, Feiner, and Viehs, 2015). Therefore, if the credit and equity 
markets perceive divestment announcement as signals of high risk for the excluded firms, 
stock prices might decrease due to a higher discount rate. 
The Liquidity Hypothesis 
Studies show a strong negative correlation between the bid-ask spread and trading volume 
(Amihud & Mendelson, 1986). Thus, a high bid-ask spread limits the liquidity of a stock and 
then in turn also the price efficiency. A portion of the bid-ask spread is connected to 
information asymmetries between investors, and the spread increases when investors perceive 
information differently (Coller & Yohn, 1997). The liquidity hypothesis proposes that public 
announcements lower information asymmetries in a market. Lower asymmetries lead to lower 






Sustainability redundancy and sustainability taste 
Cheung and Roca (2013) propose two hypotheses that can explain the abnormal returns and 
trading volume for ESG indices: the sustainability redundancy hypothesis, and the 
sustainability taste hypothesis. The former builds on traditional portfolio theory in which 
investors base their portfolio holdings solely on risk-adjusted returns. In this case, sustainable 
activities may be costly and reduce shareholders returns. The latter focuses on the extra utility 
added for investors that value sustainability. On top of the return received from holding the 
shares, additional utility is derived from holding shares in firms that operate sustainably. Thus, 
when firms are excluded from fund holdings, share prices should fall.   
Downward sloping demand curve and price pressure hypothesis 
Several important propositions in finance rely on horizontal demand curves for a firm’s equity. 
This implies that investors can buy and sell shares without significantly affecting the stock 
price. If this holds, divestment announcements should not be accompanied by a decrease in 
stock prices. However, several studies have found that this may not be true, and that large 
block sales leads to a decrease in stock prices, which means that the demand curve is 
downward sloping (Shleifer, 1986).  
According to the price pressure hypothesis this effect increases with the size of the block trade. 
The hypothesis explains this by the fact that when there are large trades, the share price must 
fall to induce investors to trade (Scholes, 1972).  
Attention and information flow 
Andrei and Hasler (2015) state that stocks that investors pay low attention to underreact to 
new information, while buying pressure and abrupt price reactions characterize stocks that 
investors pay high attention to. It is reasonable to believe that investors pay more attention to 
stocks that are covered by analysts, and that stocks with a high number of analysts covering 
them have stronger reactions to new information. Andrade, Bian and Burch (2013) show that 
the greater number of analysts covering a stock, the higher the rate of information flow in the 
market. Higher rate of information flow lowers information asymmetries and increases price 







Boehmer and Kelley (2009) argue that stocks with a higher percentage of institutional 
ownership are priced more efficiently. One natural explanation could be that institutional 
investors trade more frequently than individual investors, and therefore move their holdings 
to where it can create the most value when new information arrives. Furthermore, Sias (1996) 
finds that because institutional investors trade in larger volumes, stocks held by institutions 
tend to be associated with higher volatility. Trueman (1998) explains this by an increased 
probability of herding behaviour amongst institutional investors. One of the reasons for this 
behaviour is that the performance relative to other institutional investors are important. Thus, 
institutional investors may be inclined to act in response to other institutional investors’ actions 
in order to not fall behind. This may lead to larger price movements, increased volatility, and 















2.7 Previous studies on divestments and ESG-based 
exclusions 
As responsible investing has become a growing area of interest, the following studies have 
researched divestment events, inclusion in sustainable indices, and sustainable preferences of 
investors. 
First, a study by Dordi (2016) measured the impact of divestment related events from 2012-
2015, which include divestment pledges, endorsements, and campaigns, on the top 200 fossil 
fuel firms ranked by potential carbon emissions of their reported reserves. This effect was then 
compared to the effect of other events related to the carbon budget and stranded assets. The 
study uses both single-day and multi-day event windows and finds statistically significant 
negative abnormal returns for both. This shows that the markets do react to divestment 
announcements, not only on the day of the announcement but also in the days following the 
announcement, resulting in underperformance for the fossil-fuel firms through the post-event 
window. However, it should be noted that this effect is only found in multi-day event windows 
of five days or shorter, and events with overlapping event windows are included in the study. 
Furthermore, the study finds that divestment announcements and events related to the carbon 
budget and stranded assets have the same negative effect on share prices.  
In another paper, Cojoianu et. al (2020) measured the effect of fossil fuel divestment 
commitments on the flow of capital into the oil and gas sector across 33 countries from 2000 
to 2015. The study finds significantly lower capital flows to oil and gas companies as a result 
of divestment commitments. However, this effect is highly influenced by the specific 
country’s regulatory context, and the effect is diminished in countries that heavily subsidize 
fossil fuels. 
Kappou and Oikonomou (2016) investigated the effect on financial and operational 
performance of firms being added to or removed from the MSCI KLD 400, a well-known 
social stock index. Although this study is done on an index rather than a specific fund’s 
investment portfolio, the signaling effect to the market is similar, and their findings are also 
relevant for this study. They did not find statistically significant results for stocks added to the 
index, but did find significant negative abnormal returns for stocks being excluded from the 
index. The study also finds that trading volume is significantly higher after exclusion, and that 





A paper by Bolton and Kaperczyk (2020) studied whether investors care about carbon risk by 
analyzing whether carbon emissions affected a cross-section of US stock returns. Their results 
find that there is a correlation between exclusionary screening by institutional investors and 
direct emission intensity (total emissions to sales), but only within in the oil and gas, utilities, 
and motor industries. This correlation is only found on scope 1 emissions, which are the direct 
emissions from production, and findings show that institutional investors had significantly 
smaller holdings in companies with high scope 1 emissions intensity. This relationship 
between divestment and emission intensity is not found to be significant in industries outside 
of oil and gas, utilities, and motor industries (Bolton and Kacperczyk, 2020).  
Bassen, Kaspereit and Buchholz (2020) measured the effect of Blackrock’s announcement of 
divesting from thermal coal. Their final sample of firms consisted of 318 firms along the coal 
supply chain. Most of the firms included in the study did not experience any abnormal returns, 
however, the study does yield negative abnormal returns for the largest coal mining firms, and 
finds that this effect was strongest for firms headquartered in the US.  
Finally, a paper by Choi, Gao, and Jiang (2020) studied financial performance in relation to 
attention to global warming, by looking at events of abnormally high local temperatures and 
Google search volume related to climate change. In cases with abnormally high temperatures, 
Google search volume related to climate change increased, and carbon intensive firms 
underperformed firms with low carbon emissions in the financial markets. The study further 
finds that returns were unlikely to be due to changes in fundamentals, and that retail investors, 
rather than institutional investors, were the actors who were selling the firms. This has 
implications for our study, considering that the media attention surrounding each fossil fuel 
divestment announcement has the potential to increase the awareness of individual investors 






This thesis aims to capture the effect that fossil fuel divestment announcements have on both 
fossil fuel and renewable energy stocks. Our study is based on the belief that there is an energy 
transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy, and that divestment announcements accelerate 
this transition by affecting the returns of both fossil fuel and renewable energy stocks. 
According to the efficient market hypothesis the effects of the divestment announcements 
should be priced immediately when the market becomes aware of the new information. As 
these announcements are public information, the effects should be incorporated in stock prices 
immediately after the announcement. These beliefs are captured in the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Fossil fuel divestment announcements yield significant negative abnormal 
returns for fossil fuels firms. 
Hypothesis 1 builds on the assumption that divestment announcements contain informational 
content valued by investors. According to signaling theory, divestment announcements 
provide investors with new information and information asymmetries are reduced. 
Furthermore, this hypothesis builds on the assumption that investors view divestment 
announcements as information concerning increased risk surrounding the excluded stocks. 
Consequently, investors will divest from the excluded stocks, creating a price pressure that 
reduces stock prices. Reduced stock prices are also in line with the theory of sustainability and 
the cost of capital, in which increased risk leads to a higher cost of capital, and in turn reduces 
the stock price.  
Hypothesis 2: Fossil fuel divestment announcements yield significant positive abnormal 
returns for renewable energy firms. 
This hypothesis is built on the assumption that divestment announcements have a spillover 
effect. When investors sell their holdings in fossil fuels, they may reallocate their money to 
the renewable energy industry. Furthermore, depending on how investors perceive the 
information a divestment announcement contains, the signaling theory may be relevant. 
Investors may perceive these announcements as a shift towards a future where fossil fuel is 
gradually phased out and the renewable energy sector grows stronger. Thus, to be a part of 





their holdings in renewable energy stocks, which in turn increases the price of renewable 
energy stocks. 
Hypothesis 3: Divestment announcements yield a significant positive effect on abnormal 
trading volume for fossil fuel stocks.  
Hypothesis 4: Divestment announcements yield a significant positive effect on abnormal 
trading volume for renewable energy stocks.  
Hypotheses 3 and 4 are supported by Karpoff’s theory of trading volume. Divestment 
announcements provide new information to the stock markets, which is valued by investors. 
These hypotheses build on the assumption that divestment announcements change investor 
expectations of future returns, and furthermore change their expectations enough to affect their 
behavior, leading to abnormal trading volume surrounding the announcement date. 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 are also supported by the liquidity hypothesis. The announcement lowers 
information asymmetries between investors, increases the liquidity of the stock, and in turn 
yields higher trading volumes.  
Hypothesis 5: There is information leakage prior to the divestment announcement. 
Hypothesis 5 builds on the assumption that the efficient market hypothesis of semi-strong form 
does not hold. This implies that certain investors acquire and trade on information before the 
information is available to the public. If this hypothesis holds, abnormal returns and trading 








4. Event study methodology 
The following section covers the event study methodology applied to test our hypotheses 
regarding abnormal returns and volume of fossil fuel and renewable energy stocks around 
fossil fuel divestment announcements. Event studies are often used to test the efficient market 
hypothesis and measure the relationship between an event and the return of securities. The test 
is conducted to identify abnormal returns relating to a specific event around a specified time, 
referred to as the event window (Kritzman, 1994). 
In the beginning, most event studies conducted were only done in one country due to the strong 
assumption that there was a lack of integration between financial markets globally. However, 
due to international trade and foreign direct investment, financial literature in 1970s identified 
correlations between international financial markets, and found that international stock market 
movements were a major factor affecting domestic stock returns. Although this is well known 
in today’s markets, there are certain complicating aspects one must have in mind when 
conducting a multi-country event study. First, an appropriate market portfolio must be chosen 
for the different regions included in the study. Second, the risk of confounding events is higher 
and must be accounted for. Third, there is a lack of synchronism in the market data between 
the regions (Park, 2004). These aspects and how to control for them will be discussed further 
in this part of the study. 
According to MacKinlay (1997), the steps in an event study are as follows: 
1. Define the event window. 
2. Estimate the normal return using an appropriate return model and estimation window. 
3. Estimate abnormal returns/volume.  







4.1 Event window 
Defining the event window is one of the most crucial parts of an event study. The event 
window must be long enough to ensure that the whole effect of the event is captured, but it 
must also be short enough to exclude confounding events. Another issue with long event 
windows is that it reduces the power of the t-statistic and can lead to false conclusions about 
the significance of the event (McWilliams, et al, 1997).  
If the efficient market hypothesis were to hold, the effect on share prices should be seen 
immediately. However, even if the event is an announcement given on a specific date it is 
typical to set the event window length to more than one day, as this allows the analysis to 
capture abnormal returns around the day of the event (MacKinlay, 1997). Furthermore, 
including 3 days prior to the event in the event window allows the analysis to capture potential 
effects of information leakage, which is a breach of the efficient market hypothesis of the 
semi-strong form. 
Table 1: Event windows 
Interval Length 
Pre-event window [-3:-1] 
Short window [0:3] 
Long window [0:10] 
Full window [-3:10] 
Note: Table 1 describes the length of the different event windows. 0 denotes the event day. A negative number 
indicates number of days prior to the event day.   
This study will include four event windows. The pre-event window is designed to capture 
abnormal returns due to information leakage. To isolate the effect surrounding the actual day 
of announcement, a short window is applied. The long window is applied to capture long-term 
effects of announcements, excluding any effects of potential information leakage prior to 
announcement. Finally, the full event window should capture all abnormal returns due to 






4.2 Estimation window 
After defining an event window, an estimation window must be defined. It is most common 
to use the period prior to the event. MacKinlay (1997) suggests a period of 120 trading days 
prior to the event as a proxy for the length of the estimation window, however, other windows 
are also common. For the estimation period not to be influenced by any effects of the event, it 
is crucial that the event period itself is not included in the estimation window. If the data in 
the estimation window is tainted by return data in the event window, the abnormal return 
would be biased. Therefore, a hold-out-period should be included between the estimation 
window and the event window (Lynch & Mendenhall, 1997). 
It is also important to identify confounding events, which are separate events that could 
influence the results of the study. These events can be controlled by excluding firms with 
confounding events, grouping firms with the same confounding events, excluding firms on the 
day of the confounding event, or taking the financial impact of the confounding event into 
account during the estimation of the abnormal returns (Park, 2004).  
As Park (2004) points out, multi-country event studies add complexity to the choice of the 
appropriate estimation window, as there is a higher chance of country-specific events 
influencing the estimation window. Optimally, researchers should investigate every country 
to check if such events have occurred during the period. However, this is a very time-
consuming task for event studies covering a large number of countries. As an alternative, Park 
(2004) suggests employing a longer estimation period to reduce the potential effect these 
events can have. By doing this, unusual market movements due to country-specific events will 
only affect small portion of the estimation period.  
To reduce effects of country-specific events, this study will use an estimation window of 250 
trading days prior to the event. Furthermore, to prevent against biased results, a hold-out period 
of 21 trading days is also included.  
Table 2: Event study timeline 
 Estimation window Hold-out period Event window 
T T = [-274:-25] T = [-24:-4] T = [-3:10] 
Trading days 250 21 14 
Note: Table 2 describes the length of the estimation window, hold-out period, and event window. 0 denotes the 





4.3 Estimation of normal returns 
There are a number of approaches to calculate the normal return of a given security. These 
approaches can be grouped into statistical and economic models. Economic models rely on 
both statistical assumptions and economic arguments, while statistical models only rely on 
statistical assumptions. MacKinlay (1997) presents four models to estimate normal returns. 
First, the constant mean return model assumes that the normal return of a stock is the mean 
return of that stock, and further assumes that the mean return is constant over time. Second, 
the market model relates the return of a security to the return of a given market portfolio, 
assuming the relationship between the return of the security and the return of the market is 
linear. Third, factor models aim to reduce the variance of abnormal returns by explaining more 
of the variation in the normal return. Finally, the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is an 
equilibrium theory where the expected return of an asset depends on the risk-free rate, the 
assets covariance with, and the expected return of the market portfolio.  
Park (2004) emphasizes the importance of taking domestic factors such as exchange rates, 
inflation and GDP-growth into account when conducting a multi-country event study. Thus, 
arguments for using a factor model where these factors are accounted for could be made. 
However, data availability tends to limit the effect of these factors in event studies where daily 
data is used, as most economic data are only available on a monthly basis. Thus, there would 
be no volatility in these factors during the event window when daily returns are used and the 
event window only spans over a few days. Although other factor models such as the FF3 or 
FF5 could be used, the observations in this study are the 100 largest fossil fuel and renewable 
energy stocks measured by market capitalization at the time of the announcement. Thus, the 
added complexity of these models will not provide more accurate results, but would rather be 
biased to the SMB-factor (small minus big firms). The market model is preferable compared 
to the constant mean model because the variance of abnormal returns related to the market 
variance is reduced using the market model (MacKinlay, 1997). A problem with the CAPM is 
that the output of the model is sensitive to restrictions and that those restrictions are 
questionable. As this can be avoided by using the Market model, this study will use the Market 





4.3.1 The Market Model 
 The market model relates the return of a stock to the return of a chosen market portfolio and 
assumes that there is a linear relationship between the two. The model builds on the 
assumption that security returns are normally distributed. 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡 + 𝑖                (5.1) 
Ri and Rmkt represent the rate of return for the security and for the chosen market portfolio on 
day t. αi and βi represent the intercept (alpha) and the security’s exposure to systematic risk. 
Lastly, ε represents the error term and has expected value of zero.  
The parameters in the market model are estimated using the estimation window sample with 
an ordinary least squares regression (OLS). The estimated parameters, stock and market index 
returns are then used to measure the abnormal returns during the event window. The market 
model controls for market movements and for the risk of the stock (beta) during the event 
window (Binder, 1998).  
In order to control for geographical differences, regional market indices are used as a proxy 
for market return. As the stocks included in this study are the 100 largest fossil fuel and 
renewable energy stocks measured by market capitalization at the time of the events, the 
indices used are all mid to large capitalization indices. The following four indices are used: 
Table 3: Market indices 
Region Index Currency Market Cap Constituents 
North America MSCI North America Index USD Mid and large cap 709 
South America 
MSCI Emerging Markets Latin America 
Index USD Mid and large cap 103 
Asia Pacific MSCI AC Asia Pacific Index USD Mid and large cap 1 544 
Europe MSCI Europe Index USD Mid and large cap 432 






4.4 Abnormal returns 
After computing the normal return using the market model, the abnormal return can be 
measured. The abnormal return is the actual stock return minus the normal stock return in the 
event window. The formula for measuring abnormal returns is as follows:   
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡                (5.2) 
𝛼?̂? and 𝛽?̂? represent the estimated alpha and beta over the estimation period. 
To draw overall inferences of the event in question, the abnormal returns must be aggregated. 
The aggregation is done through two dimensions, across securities and through time 
(MacKinlay, 1997).  
4.4.1 Aggregation across securities 
Daily abnormal returns are calculated for each individual security using the formula above. 
Then, daily abnormal returns are aggregated and averaged by the number N securities for each 







𝑖=1                  (5.3) 
4.4.2 Aggregation across securities and through time 
After aggregating abnormal returns across securities, the aggregation through time can be 
calculated. When aggregating through time, the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are found 
for each individual security, and the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) is found for 
all securities combined. CAR and CAAR are the sum of returns of a given time period 
(MacKinlay, 1997). Thus, for this study’s short event window, the CAR of a given security 
will be the sum of the abnormal returns of day 0 to day 3. CAR and CAAR are calculated as 
follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑇2
𝑡= 𝑇1
                            (5.4) 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑇2
𝑡= 𝑇1





Where T1 and T2 represent the first and last day of the event window, respectively. After 
computing the CAAR, the next step is to perform a test for statistical significance.  
4.4.3 Significance testing 
To test the significance of AAR and CAAR we must compute the variance for each stock in 
the sample. The conditional variance consists of two components: the disturbance variance, 
and additional variance due to sampling error in beta and alpha. The sampling error leads to 
serial correlation even though the true disturbances are not dependent through time. However, 
by increasing the estimation window, this part of the equation approaches zero and the 
sampling error vanishes (MacKinlay, 1997). Thus, by choosing a longer estimation window it 
is reasonable to assume that this problem is avoided. The variance for each stock is computed 









2 ]              (5.6) 
However, by employing a long estimation window the second part of the equation can be 
removed and the variance for each stock is: 
𝜎2(𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) = 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2                 (5.7) 






𝑖=1                    (5.8) 
Finally, a two-tailed t-test is applied to test the significance of the CAARs over the different 





                            (5.9) 
The same formula is applied when calculating the significance of AAR. As L represents the 
length of the event window and AAR represents average abnormal returns per day in the event 










4.5 Abnormal trading volume 
This study will also measure whether divestment announcements result in abnormal trading 
volume. The trading volume metric is measured as the number of shares traded on a given day, 
divided by the number of shares outstanding. 
This is done so that the results will not be affected by the fact that some firms have a higher 
number of shares outstanding than others (Beaver, 1968).  
𝑉𝑖𝑡 = ln (
𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝑆𝑖𝑡
∗ 100)               (5.11) 
nit denotes number of shares traded for securtiy i at time t, and Sit denotes the number of 
outstanding shares for security i at time t. According to Chae (2005), trading volume can be 
highly non-normal. To correct for this, trading volume is log-transformed.  
To estimate the abnormal trading volume, the study relies on a mean-adjusted model. Formula 
5.12 shows the mean-adjusted model. 
𝐴𝑉 = 𝑉𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑉𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅                (5.12) 
Where Vit represents the trading volume metric for stock i at time t and ?̅?𝑖𝑡 represents the mean 







                          (5.13) 
T denotes the number of days in the estimation period. The same estimation window as for 
abnormal returns is applied for abnormal volume, namely 250 trading days. As with abnormal 
returns, abnormal trading volume must be aggregated across securities and through time. 






𝑖=1                (5.14) 
We further calculate the cumulative average abnormal volume (CAAV) following the same 
method as Chae (2005). Summing AAV over the days in the different event windows yields 
cumulative abnormal trading volume. Calculations are shown in formula 5.15. 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑉 = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑡
𝑇2
𝑡= 𝑇1





To test for statistical significance, the standard deviation of average abnormal trading volume 




∑ (𝐴𝑉𝑡 − 𝐴𝑉𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑇1
𝑇=𝑡0
)2              (5.16) 




               (5.17) 
4.6 Cross-sectional analysis 
To further extend our study, we perform a cross-sectional analysis. Theoretical insights can 
result from examining the relationship between the cumulative abnormal volume and 
characteristics specific for the stocks included in the study. According to MacKinlay (1997), 
a cross-sectional analysis is particularly useful when several hypotheses explaining abnormal 
volume exists. 
The regression consists of seven independent variables and three dummy variables. Free float 
and bid-ask spread are included to account for liquidity. Return on assets, debt to assets, the 
price to book ratio, and number of analysts covering the stock are included to account for firm-
specific characteristics. Finally, dummy variables representing the region of the stock 
exchange that the stock is listed on are included in the regression to test for any effects the 
regions may have on the cumulative abnormal volume.  
The following regressions are used in the cross-sectional analysis. 
𝐶𝐴𝑉 = 𝛼 + 𝛿1𝐹𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑
+ 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
+ 𝛽6𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 + 𝛽7𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠 + 𝑢 
𝐶𝐴𝑉𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
= 𝛿1𝐹𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑
+ 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
+ 𝛽6𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 + 𝛽7𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠 + 𝛿2𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ 𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎 + 𝛿3𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎 𝑂𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑎






5.1 Event selection 
Identifying divestment events 
This study consists of 15 individual divestment announcement events from 2014 to 2019. By 
the beginning of 2021, the Fossil Free campaign had listed 1,312 institutions that committed 
to divest from fossil fuels (Fossil Free, n.d.), so it is necessary to narrow down the events to a 
sample of quality events for this study. In order to select the events, we first set a window of 
time beginning in 2014, as the fossil fuel campaign had gained international traction and began 
to grow quickly at this point. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, events during and after 
December 2019 have been excluded, so the end date is set to 30th November 2019. To identify 
the individual events, the Lexis Nexis database was used to gather newspaper articles, 
newswires and press releases containing the keywords ‘fossil fuel divest’ that were published 
between 1st January 2014 and 30th November 2019. The news sources were then narrowed to 
The Guardian and Financial Times due to the Financial Times’ strong reputation for reporting 
on business matters, and the Guardian’s history of covering the fossil fuel divestment 
campaign. This resulted in the identification of 32 divestment announcement events.  
Exclusion criteria 
These events are further filtered by removing those where external confounding events fall 
within the event window, events where the event windows overlap with each other, events 
with simultaneous pledges to invest in renewable or green technology, and those with a lack 
of information. 
To identify confounding events, the LexisNexis database is again used to compile events 
related to the fossil fuel divestment campaign and the shift to renewable energy. We identified 
seven confounding events that could have an impact on the fossil fuel and renewable energy 
companies’ returns, as they include commitments or targets related to at least one of the 
industries. These confounding events are presented in appendix 1. This step excluded one 
event which included the 2014 UN Climate Summit in its event window. As mentioned 
previously, we also considered the entire COVID-19 pandemic as a confounding event, so all 





Next, we consider divestment events themselves to be confounding when their event windows 
overlap with each other. We therefore eliminate the events with overlapping event windows, 
as we cannot separate their individual effects. This step eliminated the divestment 
announcements of an additional 12 institutions. 
We further excluded the divestment events of three institutions due to their simultaneous 
pledges to invest in renewable energy alongside the divestment, as this study aims to identify 
whether fossil fuel divestment has an effect on fossil fuel stocks and whether there are 
observable spillover effects on renewable energy stocks, and the addition of a simultaneous 
pledge to invest in renewable energy could affect the results. Finally, one event was excluded 
due to a lack of relevance, as the institution that committed to divest did not actually hold 
investments in fossil fuels at that time. All excluded events can be found in appendix 2. 
After the full selection and exclusion process, we are left with 15 events on which the study is 
conducted, presented in appendix 3. Each event consists of an institution’s announcement to 
divest from at least one type of fossil fuel. 
   
5.2 Data collection and processing 
Data Collection 
Data on fossil fuel and renewable energy firms is retrieved from Refinitiv Eikon, and the data 
processing and empirical analysis of the study is done in R. To identify the 100 largest firms 
in the fossil fuel and renewable energy sectors at the date of each divestment announcement 
event, the “screener” function in Eikon is used, and the firms’ market caps are calculated by 
multiplying the shares outstanding by the share price at the event date. The full list of the fossil 
fuel and renewable energy stocks used in this study and the breakdown by region can be found 
in appendix 15, 16, 17, and 18. 
When retrieving the returns and volume for each of the top fossil fuel and renewable energy 
firms, we use daily data in order to identify abnormal returns or trading volume on each 
specific day during the event window. Daily historical stock prices (close prices), trading 
volume, and market index prices are collected in datastream through Refinitiv Eikon for 274 
days prior to the event through 10 days after the event. 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  
𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1




∗ 100)                 (6.2) 
According to Morse (1984), daily returns are preferred in all event studies, apart from cases 
where there is uncertainty about the actual date of the event. The use of daily returns is also 
supported by MacKinlay (1997) who states that studies employing daily data experience 
increased significant results.   
Data Processing: 
In a multi-country event study, there will be a lack of synchronism in stock market trading 
data between countries. Between Asian and European countries there is a difference of about 
5 or 6 hours, and there is also the same difference between European and American countries. 
This means that there is a 12-hour difference between Asian and American countries. To adjust 





(2004). It is important to note that this depends on where the stocks are trading, not where 
their operations or headquarters are. 
During the data cleaning process, observations with missing data on returns and trading 
volume are removed from the sample. Throughout this paper we refer to the sample as the top 
100 fossil fuel and renewable energy stocks at the time of each divestment announcement, but 
the exact number of observations for each divestment vary slightly due to this processing step. 
The final number of observations for fossil fuels and renewable energy stocks is shown in 
table 4. Initial sample, exclusions, and the final sample for fossil fuel and renewable energy 
stocks separately can be found in appendix 4 and 5. 






07.05.2014 Stanford University 200 15 185 
07.10.2014 Australian Local Government Super 200 15 185 
23.11.2014 KLP 200 12 188 
19.01.2015 Nordea 200 12 188 
05.02.2015 
Norwegian Government Pension Fund 
Global 
200 12 188 
02.03.2015 City of Oslo 200 10 190 
08.07.2015 University of Warwick 200 14 186 
10.09.2015 University of California 200 11 189 
01.04.2016 Saudi Arabia 200 12 188 
13.12.2016 Southwark council pension fund 200 15 185 
15.05.2017 BMO Global Asset Management 200 11 189 
05.02.2018 Edinburgh University 200 9 191 
12.07.2018 Republic of Ireland 200 12 188 
09.03.2019 
Norwegian Government Pension Fund 
Global 
200 13 187 
07.05.2019 KLP 200 17 183 
  Total 3 000 190 2 810 
Note: Table 4 displays the date of the divestment announcement, the divesting institution, and the quantity of 
the sample of the top fossil fuel and renewable energy stocks by market cap at the date of the announcement 
(this number does not represent the institutions’ holdings in fossil fuel or renewable energy stocks). Each event 
starts with 200 initial stocks. The exclusions column presents the number of stocks removed due to missing 
data, and the final sample column presents the number of stocks on which the analysis is conducted. 
To treat for outliers in the estimation window, the data is winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles, as these outliers could affect the results of the regression used to calculate 
abnormal returns during the event window. Additionally, the returns and trading volume are 
log transformed. As suggested by Henderson (1990), although log transformation does not 





transformed returns as this step improves the normality of the return distribution. The returns 
are log transformed using the following formula (Henderson, 1990): 
       𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = ln (1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡)                (6.3) 
where Rit = continuously compounded return on security i in period t. 
We also log transform trading volume, as a paper by Ajinkya & Jain (1989) states that the 
natural log transformed volume can improve the normality of the distribution (Ajinkya & Jan, 
1989). 
       𝑉𝑖𝑡 = ln (1 + 𝑉𝑖𝑡)                          (6.4) 
Appendix 6, 7, 8, and 9 present the distributions of returns and volume for fossil fuel and 
renewable energy stocks. As the figures display a bell curve shape we can infer that the 
normality assumption holds. Table 5 shows a summary of the data used in this study.  
Table 5: Summary Statistics 
Statistic Min Pctl(25) Median Mean Pctl(75) Max St. Dev. 
CAR (FF) -0.416 -0.048 -0.012 -0.012 0.025 0.308 0.067 
CAR (RE) 
-1.395 -0.069 -0.009 -0.008 0.054 1.976 0.142 
CAV (FF) -1.568 -0.208 0.042 0.392 0.861 3.441 1.206 
CAV (RE) 
-6.218 -1.677 -0.114 -0.169 0.881 6.721 3.078 
Free float (FF) 0.108 0.357 0.826 0.683 0.994 0.999 0.332 
Free Float (RE) 
0.239 0.418 0.629 0.628 0.827 1 0.243 
Institutional 
Investor (FF) 
0.017 0.135 0.378 0.439 0.749 0.956 0.325 
Institutional 
Investor (RE) 
0 0.019 0.192 0.274 0.479 0.82 0.271 
ROA (FF) -0.049 0.017 0.044 0.044 0.075 0.126 0.045 
ROA (RE) 
-0.533 -0.06 0.012 -0.041 0.053 0.161 0.173 
D/A (FF) 
0.063 0.167 0.242 0.27 0.363 0.542 0.135 
D/A (RE) 0 0.072 0.234 2.782 0.418 817.199 40.325 
P/B (FF) 
0.56 1.079 1.589 2.129 2.535 7.105 1.606 
P/B (RE) 0 0.946 1.819 5.925 3.363 1,016.27 42.779 
Note: Table 5 presents summary statistics for the sample of the top 100 fossil fuel and top 100 renewable 
energy stocks, as ranked by market cap, at the date of each divestment announcement. CAR FF, CAR RE, 
CAF FF, and CAV RE are calculated for the long event window. Free float represents the percentage of the 






6. Empirical findings and results 
The following section displays our empirical findings and interpretation of results. We first 
present findings on abnormal returns. As we do not find significant abnormal returns for fossil 
fuel stocks or renewable energy stocks separately, we present the difference in cumulative 
average abnormal returns (CAAR) in section 6.1 to analyze whether the impact of divestment 
announcements differs significantly between the two industries. Average abnormal return 
(AAR) and CAAR for fossil fuel and renewable energy stocks with their respective T-stat can 
be found in appendix 10, 11, 12, and 13.  
Second, we present the findings on cumulative average abnormal volume CAAV. As CAAV 
is statistically significant for both fossil fuel and renewable energy stocks, this is presented 
separately for both industries. Finally, we present the findings of the cross-sectional analysis, 
followed by the interpretation of the results and robustness checks. 
6.1 Abnormal returns 
We do not find significant abnormal returns for fossil fuel stocks or renewable energy stocks 
on a daily basis nor when looking at the defined event windows. Hypothesis 1 states that 
divestment announcements should yield significant negative abnormal returns for fossil fuel 
stocks. As our results do not support this, hypothesis 1 is rejected. Furthermore, hypothesis 2 
builds on the assumption that the divestment announcements should have a spillover effect on 
renewable energy stocks, and states that we should see significant positive abnormal return 
for renewable energy stocks. Our results do not support this and hypothesis 2 is rejected.   
We further compare the difference in CAAR between fossil fuels and renewable energy to 
identify whether there is a stronger negative reaction in fossil fuels compared to renewable 
energy. As we do not find any significant differences in CAAR between the two industries, as 
presented in Table 6, we again cannot say that fossil fuel divestment announcements have a 







Table 6: Comparison of CAAR for fossil fuel and renewable energy stocks 
Event window CAAR FF CAAR RE Difference T-stat 
Pre-event 0.043 % -0.464 % 0.507 % 1.375 
Short window -0.780 % -0.623 % -0.157 % -0.369 
Long window -1.383 % -0.365 % -1.017 % -1.441 
Full window -1.339 % -0.829 % -0.510 % -0.641 
Note: Table 6 displays the difference in CAAR for fossil fuel stocks and renewable energy stocks. The T-stat 
represents the significance of the difference in CAAR. Significance levels: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Figure 1 presents AAR and the development in CAAR for fossil fuel and renewable energy 
stocks over the full event window. Renewable energy stocks experience considerable declines 
in return two days prior to the event and on the event day. Fossil fuel stocks experience a stable 
decline in returns from one day before the announcement to four days after. On day eight after 
the announcement fossil fuel stocks continue to decline, whilst renewable energy stocks 
experience positive abnormal returns. 
Figure 1: AAR and CAAR over the full event window 
 
Note: Figure 1 presents the average abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns for fossil fuel 
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6.2 Abnormal trading volume 
The following section presents the analysis of abnormal trading volume for both fossil fuel 
and renewable energy stocks around fossil fuel divestment announcements. We first calculate 
the CAAV for fossil fuel and renewable energy stocks following the methodology used by 
Chae (2005), presented in the table below. Fossil fuel stocks experience significant positive 
abnormal volume as a result of divestment announcements, while renewable energy stocks 
experience significant negative abnormal volume. 
Table 7: CAAV - Fossil fuels and renewable energy 
 Fossil fuels Renewable energy 
Event window CAAV (%) T-stat CAAV (%) T-stat 
Pre-event 8.54 %  1.555  -2.54 %  -0.697  
Short window 13.75 %  2.169**  -6.31 %  -1.500  
Long window 34.85 %  3.314***  -26.84 %  -3.849***  
Full window 43.38 %  3.657***  -29.38 %  -3.735***  
Note: Table 7 displays the CAAV for fossil fuel and renewable energy stocks. Significance levels: *p<0.10, 
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Hypothesis 3 states that divestment announcements should yield positive abnormal volume 
for fossil fuel stocks. We find positive CAAV in our short-, long-, and full window, and our 
findings are statistically significant at the 5% level for the short window and at the 1% level 
for the long and full windows. As a result, hypothesis 3 is not rejected. Hypothesis 4 states 
that divestment announcements should yield positive abnormal volume for renewable energy 
stocks. As we find negative CAAV in our long- and full window and our findings are 






Figure 2: CAAV over the full event window 
 
Note: Figure 2 presents the CAAV for fossil fuel and renewable energy stocks over the full event window. 
 Figure 2 presents the development in CAAV for fossil fuel and renewable energy stocks over 
the full event window. As seen from the figure, CAAV moves in the opposite direction for the 
two industries.  
One possible explanation for the negative CAAV found for renewable energy stocks could be 
an abnormally high bid-ask spread over the event window. Figure 3 displays the abnormal bid-
ask spread for fossil fuel and renewable energy stocks over the event window. As illustrated 
by the graph, the average bid-ask spread for renewable energy stocks is higher than for fossil 
fuel stocks. Although we do not find statistically significant results for abnormal bid-ask 
spread for fossil fuel or renewable energy stocks, the direction displayed in figure 3 could be 
a possible factor in explaining the difference in CAAV, as renewable energy stocks seem to 
display higher abnormal bid-ask spreads from day three to day nine after fossil fuel divestment 
























Figure 3:Abnormal bid-ask spread over the full event window 
 
Note: Figure 3 presents the abnormal bid-ask spread and the average abnormal bid-ask spread for fossil fuel 
and renewable energy stocks over the full event window.  
 
Based on our findings for both abnormal returns and abnormal volume, we can now assess 
hypothesis 5, which states that there is information leakage prior to the divestment 
announcements. The study yields no statistically significant abnormal returns or abnormal 
volume on the days before the event for fossil fuel stocks nor for renewable energy stocks, and 
therefore hypothesis 5 is rejected.  
Finally, we conduct a cross-sectional analysis to see cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) is 
affected by liquidity measures, percentage of institutional investors, firm-specific 
characteristics, and the region. To control for regional fixed effects, we add regional dummy 
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Table 8: Cross-sectional analysis - CAV 







Free Float 0.050 0.257 
 
(0.2343) (0.2194) 
   
Spread -0.032 -0.048 
 
(0.0428) (0.0380) 
   
Institutional Investor 0.262 0.655*** 
(0.2459) (0.2521) 
   
ROA 1.440* 1.256* 
 
(0.8295) (0.7367) 
   
D/A 0.814** 0.783** 
 
(0.3858) (0.3574) 
   
P/B 0.072** 0.073** 
 
(0.0322) (0.0294) 
   
Analysts 0.012** 0.009 
 
(0.0051) (0.0075) 
   




   









   
Constant -0.739*** -1.188*** 
 
(0.1995) (0.3662) 
Observations 2,642 2,642 
Adjusted R2 0.021 0.024 
Note: Table 8 presents the cross-sectional analysis of cumulative abnormal volume for the full sample of 
fossil fuel and renewable energy stocks. Regression 1 does not control for regional fixed effects, while 
regression 2 does. Fossil fuel is a dummy for the type of energy, free float represents the percentage of 
tradable shares, institutional investor represents the firm’s percentage of institutional investors for the firm, 









Regression 1, which does not include regional controls, explains 2.1% of the variation in CAV. 
When adding regional controls in regression 2, the model explains 2.4% of the variation in 
CAV. We will focus on regression 2, as it includes the additional regional controls. First, the 
results show that the coefficient for fossil fuels is positive and significant at the 1% level, 
which helps to support our findings regarding CAAV. Next, we find that the percent of 
institutional investors for a firm is positively correlated with CAV and significant at the 1% 
level. This could be explained by the Sias (1996), who notes that institutional investors trade 
more frequently and in larger volumes. Finally, the firm specific traits which include return 
on assets, debt to assets, and price to book, are all positively correlated to CAV. Although 
regression 2 only explains 2.4% of the variation in CAV, which means it has low explanatory 
power, several of the coefficients are statistically significant and can help to explain some of 
the drivers behind abnormal trading volume. 
6.3 Interpretation of results 
This study yields no significant results concerning abnormal returns and hypotheses 1 and 2 
are rejected. However, we do find significant results concerning abnormal trading volume. 
Based on these results, we do not reject hypothesis 3, but reject hypothesis 4 due to negative 
abnormal volume. Finally, as we do not observe abnormal results for returns or volume in the 
pre-event window, hypothesis 5 is rejected. Our hypotheses build on the theories presented in 
the theoretical framework in section 2 and rely on the following assumptions: 
• Market efficiency of semi-strong form. 
• Asymmetric information exists in financial markets. 
• Divestment announcements include information valued by investors. 
• Divestment announcements have spillover effects. 
• The demand curve is downward sloping. 
• New information increases trading volume. 
This study relies on the assumption that markets are efficient in the semi-strong form, entailing 
that new information should be incorporated quickly and correctly in stock prices when made 
public. Thus, the effect on stock prices should be reflected within a short period of time if 
investors value the information provided in divestment announcements. Furthermore, the 





investors are rational and interpret information the same way. We identify two plausible 
explanations for the lack of significant results. First, investors are already aware of the 
information divestment announcements contain, and thus, the information is already 
incorporated in stock prices. Second, there is a possibility that investors view the information 
differently and the stocks’ equilibrium price is not changed.  
According to the signaling theory, divestment announcements could be seen as means to lower 
information asymmetries in the markets. The lack of significant results in our study might be 
explained by the fact that investors became aware of the ongoing divestment campaign over 
time, and therefore the more recent announcements did not entail strong signals. For example, 
KLP has slowly been lowering its threshold of coal investments, and new divestment 
announcements could therefore have been anticipated by investors. Furthermore, the lack of 
results might be explained by low quality of the signalers. Firms who have given signals in 
the past about shifting to renewable energy or being sustainable without following through 
(greenwashing) may have less valuable signals in events such as divestment announcements. 
For example, in April 2016 Saudi Arabia announced that they would sell state oil assets 
(Macalister, 2016). However, as of 2021 the Saudi Arabian government is still the largest 
owner (98.18%) of the world’s largest integrated oil and gas company, Saudi Aramco.  
This study relies on the assumption that divestment announcements contain valuable 
information for investors. However, this assumption might be too strong, and the information 
provided might only be valued by a subset of investors. Beaver (1968) provides two definitions 
of informational content. First, a divestment announcement has informational content if 
investors’ expectations of the stock’s future performance is changed. Second, the change in 
expectations must be large enough to change investor holdings. This means that even if 
divestment announcements have enough informational content to change investors' 
expectations, it may not change the expectations of enough investors to affect stock prices.  
Furthermore, Beaver (1968) provides an explanation for why we observe abnormal trading 
volume but not abnormal returns. If investors interpret the information in divestment 
announcements differently, it can take some time before they agree on a new equilibrium price, 
and during this period volume increases. If one assumes homogeneous risk preferences among 
investors, there would be a price reaction and no volume reaction after the announcement until 
a new equilibrium price is reached. Beaver (1968) further explains abnormal returns as 





information only changes the expectations for a subset of investors. Thus, significant abnormal 
volume and the lack of abnormal returns can be explained by heterogeneous risk preferences 
amongst investors. As a result, only a subset of investors find the information provided in 
divestment announcements valuable enough to change their portfolio holdings. 
Karpoff (1986) states that trading volume is somewhat persistent over time. The reasons for 
this could be that not all investors receive the information at the same time, investors are not 
able to trade as much as they want right away and must do their trades gradually, or that 
investors make mistakes and then correct them later. These three reasons could explain why 
we do not find significant results when looking at daily trading volume, and do find 
statistically significant cumulative average abnormal volume.  
The belief that the demand curve is downward sloping entails that large block trades in theory 
should lead to a decrease in stock prices because investors must accept a lower price in order 
to sell their holdings. By contrast, if the demand curve is horizontal, investors should be able 
to buy and sell stocks without any significant impact on stock prices. This study does not yield 
any results that can confirm or deny the existence of a downward sloping demand curve.  
Cheung and Roca (2013) studied the effect that being added to or deleted from a sustainability 
index had on the stock prices. One of their findings was that stocks being included in 
sustainability indices in Asia experienced negative returns. This led to their hypothesis of 
sustainability redundancy in Asia. Interestingly, our analysis yields some similar results. On 
the day of the divestment announcement the abnormal return of renewable energy stocks 
located in Asia is negative 0.972% and statistically significant at the 10% level. However, this 
observation was only made for one day and when looking at the cumulative abnormal returns 
there were no significant results. These findings are presented in Appendix 14. 
The next assumption this study relies on is that divestment announcements have a spillover 
effect, entailing that when the announcements of divestment from fossil fuels stocks are made 
one might see a shift in investor holdings to renewable energy stocks. The fact that this does 
not seem to be the case in this study could be explained by the possibility that investors with 
a strong sustainability focus are already positioned in renewable energy stocks, and thus, the 
announcements do not lead to any additional shift in investor holdings.  
According to Karpoff (1986), volume decreases if the demand price of potential sellers 





owners). This can explain why we find significant negative abnormal trading volume for 
renewable energy after the divestment announcement. Investors who already own renewable 
energy stocks may view divestment announcements as a sign that the market will shift to a 
more sustainable future, while potential buyers may not view the information provided in the 
same way. As such, divestment announcements do not change investors’ initial beliefs, and 
instead may cause further divergence between investors. This could also explain why we do 
not find significant abnormal returns for renewable energy stocks.  
6.4 Robustness check 
6.4.1 Comparison to Dordi (2016) 
As mentioned in the literature review, a study by Dordi (2016) conducted a similar analysis 
on the impacts of divestment related events on the fossil fuel industry and found that the 
announcements of fossil-fuel divestment did have a statistically significant negative impact on 
the share price of fossil fuel firms. As we find that there is no statistically significant impact 
on the returns of fossil fuel firms, we identify the following key differences between our 
studies and conduct robustness checks that can help to explain the differences in our findings. 
1. Event type: Dordi (2016) includes not only the divestment pledges of institutions, 
but also endorsements and campaigns related to divestment, for example the 2014 
endorsement by Ban Ki-moon. As our study aims to specifically measure the impact 
of divestment pledges of institutions, we did not include endorsements or campaigns, 
and considered Ban Ki-moon’s endorsement to be a confounding event. 
2. Time range: Dordi’s study was conducted in 2016, so there are no divestment 
related events included after 2015. As our study is conducted in 2021, we use a wider 
time range and include events up until the end of 2019, when the COVID-19 
pandemic began. 
3. Event selection: When selecting events for our study, we excluded divestment 
events with overlapping event windows to avoid the effect of confounding events, so 
events that fall within –3:10 days of each other were removed from our study. 
However, Dordi (2016) included events with overlapping event windows, with some 





4. Sample of firms: The sample in Dordi’s study consists of the top 200 fossil fuel 
firms, ranked by the potential carbon emissions content of their reported reserves, 
while we used the top 100 fossil fuel companies ranked by market cap. However, 
Dordi (2016) notes that the largest corporations account for the largest share of 
potential production and emissions, so this may not be the largest driver of the 
differences between our results. 
5. Market index: When calculating abnormal returns, Dordi (2016) uses the MSCI all-
country world index. However, in this study we separate the companies by region 
and use the respective regional market indices to control for geographical differences. 
The market in our study is therefore represented by the MSCI North America Index, 
MSCI Emerging Markets Latin America Index, MSCI AC Asia Pacific Index, or the 
MSCI Europe Index. 
The five points listed above can help to explain why Dordi (2016) finds significant negative 
impacts on fossil fuel firms while we do not. After closer examination and the conducting 
robustness checks presented in table 9, we identify the event type, time range, and event 
selection to be the main drivers of the significant negative CAAR results for fossil fuels in 
Dordi’s study. First, an examination of their results shows that around half of the significant 
results stem from events which are not institutional divestment pledges. As we did not include 
these types of events, this could suggest that the campaigns and endorsements, or the global 
movement itself, is the driver of the impacts on the fossil fuel movement rather than the 
individual firms pledging to divest.  
Second, the time range of divestment events is another factor that can change the significance 
of the results. As Dordi included events up until 2015, we tested our analysis using only events 
up until the end of 2015 and found significant negative CAAR in the fossil fuel industry, 
presented in Table 9. This suggests that events in the earlier years of the fossil fuel divestment 
movement had a greater impact than those occurring in the later years. This could be 
interpreted using signaling theory and information asymmetries. Specifically, Stiglitz (2000) 
identifies information about intent as a type of information where asymmetries play an 
important part. In this case, the start of the fossil fuel divestment movement may have signaled 
to investors that many major institutions around the world had the intention to divest from 
fossil fuels, and with this knowledge the investors may have adjusted their portfolios 
accordingly. In the later years, the divestment campaigns may have already been happening 





information to investors, who were already aware of this movement and had reacted in the 
earlier years. This is illustrated in Table 9, which presents significant negative CAAR for fossil 
fuel stocks in the short, long, and full windows if we exclude events after 2015 as done by 
Dordi (2016). 
Finally, we tested for the difference in event selection by narrowing down our sample to only 
include the events that our study has in common with Dordi (2016), which again are all prior 
to 2016. This results in significant negative CAAR for fossil fuel firms in the short, long, and 
full event windows. 
Table 9: CAAR for fossil fuels - Comparison to Dordi (2016) 
 Events before 2016 Events included by Dordi 
Event window CAAR (%) T-stat CAAR (%) T-stat 
Pre-event -0.038 % -0.055 0.470 % 0.480 
Short window -1.391 % -1.753* -2.045 % -1.811* 
Long window -3.041 % -2.310** -4.013 % -2.142** 
Full window -3.078 % -2.073** -3.543 % -1.677* 
Note: Table 9 displays the CAAR for fossil fuel stocks using only events before 2016, and only events included 
by Dordi (2016). Significance levels: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
We then conducted the same two robustness checks for renewable energy stocks, by narrowing 
down the sample to events prior to 2016 and further to those in common with Dordi (2016). 
However, we still do not find significant results for renewable energy firms in either case. 
These findings are presented in table 10. 
Table 10: CAAR for renewable energy - Comparison to Dordi (2016) 
 Events before 2016 Events included by Dordi 
Event window CAAR (%) T-stat CAAR (%) T-stat 
Pre-event -0.663 % -0.650 -0.495 % -0.313 
Short window -0.600 % -0.509 -1.538 % -0.842 
Long window -0.172 % -0.088 -3.673 % -1.213 
Full window -0.835 % -0.379 -4.168 % -1.220 
Note: Table 10 displays the CAAR for renewable energy stocks using only events before 2016, and only events 
included by Dordi (2016). Significance levels: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
As shown above, even in the earlier time frame of the divestment movement in which fossil 
fuel stocks experience significant negative abnormal returns, we still do not find any 





6.4.2 Abnormal trading volume and google search volume 
Finally, we conduct a third robustness check by measuring attention to fossil fuels versus 
renewable energy around the divestment announcements. This check is based on a study by 
Choi, Gao and Jiang (2020), which found that in events of abnormally high local temperature, 
attention to climate change as proxied by Google search volume increases, and in financial 
markets, stocks of carbon-intensive firms underperform those with low carbon emissions. 
Using historical Google Trends data extracted in R, we measure the abnormal search volume 
for the search terms: “fossil fuel divestment”, “fossil fuel”, “energy transition”, and 
“renewable energy” around the fossil fuel divestment announcements in our study. This results 
in positive significant abnormal search volume for the search term “fossil fuel” on the day of 
divestment announcements and one day after. However, we still do not find any significant 
results for renewable energy. The results can help to support the findings of positive 
cumulative average abnormal trading volume for fossil fuels, and do not provide additional 
insights for renewable energy. It can also help to support the findings of significant negative 
cumulative average abnormal returns for fossil fuel stocks and no significant effects on 
renewable energy stocks prior to 2016. 
Table 11: Abnormal Google search volume by keyword 
  Fossil fuel divestment Energy transition 
Event day Abnormal search volume T-stat Abnormal search volume T-stat 
-1 -1.158 -0.505 9.158 1.101 
0 -2.158 -0.942 -2.842 -0.342 
1 -0.158 -0.069 11.158 1.342 
     
  Fossil fuel Renewable energy 
Event day Abnormal search volume T-stat Abnormal search volume T-stat 
-1 -10.053 -0.449 50.053 0.758 
0 71.947 3.214*** 94.053 1.424 
1 40.947 1.829* 75.053 1.136 
Note: Table 11 displays the abnormal Google search volume for the keywords “fossil fuel divestment”, “energy 
transition”, “fossil fuel”, and “renewable energy” on the event day and one day before and after, as well as 







6.4.3 Potential overlapping 
Some of the events included in the analysis are potentially overlapping in their estimation 
period. This means that there is a risk of over-/underestimating the abnormal returns depending 
on the stock’s reaction to the earlier events. According to Park (2004) this can be solved by 
employing a long estimation window and/or excluding potentially overlapping events. 
Therefore, this study utilizes an estimation window of 250 trading days to reduce these 
potential problems. Furthermore, we tested the analysis with exclusions of the events with 
overlapping estimation periods and found that this did not significantly change the results. 
Therefore, we are confident that the results accurately present the impact of divestment 







7. Conclusion and limitations 
7.1 Conclusion 
This thesis assessed whether fossil fuel divestment announcements of institutions truly have a 
financial impact on the energy transition, and utilized event study methodology to measure the 
abnormal returns and trading volume of the top hundred global fossil fuel and renewable 
energy stocks with the highest market capitalization at the date of divestment announcements 
from 2014 through 2019. 
We do not find any statistically significant cumulative average abnormal return for fossil fuel 
or renewable energy firms during the event windows, so we reject both hypothesis 1 and 2, 
which state that fossil fuel divestment announcements yield significant negative abnormal 
returns for fossil fuel stocks and positive abnormal returns for renewable energy stocks, 
respectively. It is interesting to note that the abnormal returns are significant when excluding 
events after 2015. We interpret this through signaling theory, which could suggest that the 
growth of the fossil fuel movement over the first few years signaled to investors that 
institutions would have future intentions to divest. Therefore, in the years after 2015 investors 
may have already been aware of the movement and had reacted accordingly, so the newer 
divestment announcements did not provide significantly new information. 
We find significant positive cumulative abnormal volume for fossil fuel stocks in the short, 
long, and full windows, and significant negative cumulative abnormal volume for renewable 
energy stocks in the long and full windows. Therefore, we cannot reject hypothesis 3, which 
states that divestment announcements yield a significant positive effect on abnormal trading 
volume for fossil fuel stocks, and reject hypothesis 4, which states that divestment 
announcements yield a significant positive effect on abnormal trading volume for renewable 
energy stocks. The negative effect on trading volume for renewable energy stocks could 
suggest that investors are heterogeneous and interpret the divestment announcements 
differently. 
Finally, we do not find any statistically significant abnormal returns or volume during the pre-
event window, so we reject hypothesis 5, which states that there is information leakage prior 





In closing, although the results do not show a significant negative impact on the returns of 
fossil fuel and renewable energy stocks, this study contributes to the fossil fuel divestment 
debate by analyzing the effect on renewable energy and trading volume. As the world 
continues to transition to a net zero energy system, we can expect the fossil fuel divestment 
movement to continue to evolve, and recommend future studies in this area of interest. 
7.2 Limitations 
When considering the results of this event study analysis, several limitations should be taken 
into account. First, each divestment announcement event is unique to the institution making 
the announcement, and therefore the divestment criteria, type of fossil fuel excluded, size of 
divestment, and the timeline vary across events. For example, although some divestment 
announcements stated the criteria for divestment, such as companies with a certain percentage 
of revenue that is attributed to a type of fossil fuel, most announcements did not specify the 
exact criteria for divestment.  
Additionally, the divesting institutions themselves may have different levels of credibility. If 
firms have made announcements in the past and not followed through, or if they have been 
known to engage in greenwashing by making their firm seem more sustainable than it truly is, 
investors may not react as strongly to their divestment announcements. Greenwashing has 
been found to negatively affect consumers’ ‘green trust’ (Chen and Chang, 2012), which 
suggests that some firms’ announcements on divesting could be trusted less by the market. 
Finally, the indices used for the market returns cover broad regions, such as Asia Pacific and 









7.3 Suggestions for future research 
As the IEA’s 2021 report suggests, the world must transition from fossil fuels to renewable 
energy in order to meet the international targets set on climate change. Fossil fuel divestment 
is therefore a relevant topic for further studies to provide more evidence in the debate 
surrounding the topic. First, as we find a difference in significance between the early and later 
years of the divestment campaign, it would be of interest to conduct this event study again 
after another five years to expand the time frame further and examine whether the significance 
changes. 
Additionally, our study measures the impacts of fossil fuel divestment on the top hundred 
fossil fuel and renewable energy firms by market capitalization. It would be interesting to 
conduct a similar study on the fossil fuel and renewable energy firms that are held by the 
divesting institution and would be excluded as a result of the announcement, as this could 
provide an understanding of direct impacts rather than the industry impacts. 
Finally, although individual fossil fuel divestment announcements may not have a significant 
financial impact, they could help to raise awareness around climate change and energy 
transition issues. A study on this topic could be done in a similar manner to Darwin, Gao, and 
Jiang (2020), who find that in abnormally warm weather events, attention to climate change 
as proxied by Google search volume increases, and stocks of carbon intensive firms 
underperform those with low carbon emissions. As many investors state that divestment is 
meaningful through its symbolism, it would be interesting to further assess whether fossil fuel 
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Appendix 1: Confounding events 
Date Confounding Event 
23.09.2014 UN Climate Summit 
24.10.2014 EU agrees to a 40% greenhouse gas cut by 2030 and a target for at least 27% 
share renewable energy 
04.11.2014 Ban Ki-moon endorses fossil fuel divestment 
12.11.2014 US-China emissions deal 
14.12.2014 Lima Accord 
14.03.2015 UN backs fossil fuel divestment campaign 
25.06.2015 Bill Gates commits to invest USD $2bn in breakthrough renewable energy 
projects 
12.12.2015 COP21: Paris Agreement 
04.11.2016 Paris Agreement entered into force 
Note: Appendix 1 presents the confounding events identified in the study and their respective dates. 
1. 23 September 2014: The 2014 UN Climate Summit was held with a purpose to serve 
as a precursor to the 2015 Paris agreement, advocating for countries to focus on cutting 
emissions (UNFCCC, 2014-c). 
2. 10 October 2014: The European Council endorsed a binding target of at least a 40% 
domestic reduction in greenhouse gases and a 27% share of renewable energy 
consumed in the EU by 2030 (UNFCCC, 2014-b).  
3. 4 November 2014: UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon asked companies to reduce 
fossil fuel investments at a press conference and stated, “I have been urging companies 
like pension funds or insurance companies to reduce their investments in coal and a 
fossil-fuel based economy to move to renewable sources of energy” (UNFCCC, 2014-
a). 
4. 12 November 2014: A landmark deal between the US and China to reduce emissions 
was announced. As part of this deal, China set a target to increase the share of non-
fossil fuel energy consumption to around 20% by 2030 (Safi, et al., 2014).  
5. 14 December 2014: The Lima Accord was created as an agreement between 190 





requirements, but the nations were expected to create their own plans on policies to cut 
emissions (Davenport, 2014).  
6. 14 March 2015: The Guardian broke the news that the UN supported the fossil fuel 
campaign, citing a quote by the spokesman for the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, who said that divestment sent a signal to companies that the current 
situation of burning fossil fuels cannot continue (Carrington, 2015). 
7. 30 June 2015: Bill Gates announced that he would double his investments in green 
technologies to USD $2bn over the period of 2015 to 2020, including renewable energy 
technologies. He simultaneously called for governments to increase their investments 
in R&D for renewable energy technologies (Adams and Thornhill, 2015). 
8. 12 December 2015: The Paris Agreement was adopted at COP 21 by 196 Parties, 
which aimed to limit global warming to well below 2°C. Countries agreed to take 
action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (UNFCCC, n.d.). 
9. 4 November 2016: The Paris Agreement entered into force (UNFCCC, n.d.). 
Appendix 2: Excluded events 
Date Excluded Institution 
11.07.2014 World Council of Churches 
22.09.2014 Rockefeller Brothers Fund 
24.03.2015 Syracuse University 
01.04.2015 Guardian Media Group 
24.04.2015 SOAS University of London 
30.04.2015 Church of England 
13.05.2015 London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
14.05.2015 University of Washington 
19.05.2015 University of Oxford 
22.05.2015 University of Hawai'i 
23.05.2015 AXA 
27.05.2015 Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global 
12.12.2017 AXA 
10.01.2018 New York City 
21.01.2018 Lloyd's of London 
31.02.2018 Generali 
12.06.2019 Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global 
Note: Appendix 2 presents the events that were excluded from the study during
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Appendix 3: Final sample of divestment announcement events (Values denoted in USD) 
Date Institution Fund Value Divestment Fossil Fuel Type Divestment Criteria 
07.05.2014 Stanford University 18.70 B NA Coal mining Coal mining as a principal business 
07.10.2014 Australian Local 
Government Super 
7.46 B 23.32 MM Coal mining or coal fired 
electricity generation 
Over 1/3 revenue from coal mining or 
coal-fired electricity generation 
23.11.2014 KLP 70.00 B 73.73 MM Coal More than 50% revenue from coal 
18.01.2015 Nordea 264.57 B 116.04 MM Coal mining Large and sustained exposure to thermal 
coal mining 
05.02.2015 Norwegian Government 
Pension Fund Global 
850.00 B NA Coal NA 
02.03.2015 City of Oslo NA 7.00 MM Coal NA 
08.07.2015 University of Warwick 0.02 B 1.56 MM Coal, oil, gas NA 
10.09.2015 University of California 98.00 B 200.00 MM Coal, oil sands NA 
01.04.2016 Saudi Arabia NA 2000000.00 
MM 
Petroleum NA 
13.12.2016 Southwark council 
pension fund 
1.52 B NA All fossil fuels NA 
15.05.2017 BMO Global Asset 
Management 
1.93 B 25.79 MM All fossil fuels All companies with fossil fuel reserves 
05.02.2018 Edinburgh University 1.40 B 8.79 MM Coal, oil, gas NA 
12.07.2018 Republic of Ireland 9.13 B 342.24 MM Coal, oil, peat, gas 20% or more revenue from exploration, 
extraction or refinement of fossil fuels 
09.03.2019 Norwegian Government 
Pension Fund Global 
1000.00 B 7500.00 MM Oil, gas NA 
07.05.2019 KLP 80.00 B 365.98 MM Coal More than 5% revenue from coal-based 
activities 
Note: Appendix 3 shows the included events, size of divesting fund, divestment amount, which type of fossil fuel the institution divested from and their divestment criteria. 
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Appendix 4: Final sample - Fossil fuel stocks 
Date Institution Initial sample Exclusions Final sample 
07.05.2014 Stanford University 100 4 96 
07.10.2014 Australian Local Government Super 100 5 95 
23.11.2014 KLP 100 2 98 
18.01.2015 Nordea 100 3 97 
05.02.2015 Norwegian Government Pension Fund 
Global 100 3 97 
02.03.2015 City of Oslo 100 2 98 
08.07.2015 University of Warwick 100 1 99 
10.09.2015 University of California 100 1 99 
01.04.2016 Saudi Arabia 100 1 99 
13.12.2016 Southwark council pension fund 100 4 96 
15.05.2017 BMO Global Asset Management 100 3 97 
05.02.2018 Edinburgh University 100 3 97 
12.07.2018 Republic of Ireland 100 2 98 
09.03.2019 Norwegian Government Pension Fund 
Global 100 1 99 
07.05.2019 KLP 100 1 99 
  Total 1500 36 1464 
Note: Appendix 4 displays the date of the divestment announcement, the divesting institution, and the quantity 
of the sample of the top fossil fuel and renewable energy companies by market cap at the date of the 
announcement. Each event starts with 100 initial stocks. The exclusions column presents the number of 
observations removed due to missing data, and the final sample column presents the number of stocks that the 














Appendix 5: Final sample - Renewable energy stocks 
Date Institution Initial sample Exclusions Final sample 
07.05.2014 Stanford University 100 11 89 
07.10.2014 Australian Local Government Super 100 10 90 
23.11.2014 KLP 100 10 90 
18.01.2015 Nordea 100 9 91 
05.02.2015 Norwegian Government Pension Fund 
Global 100 9 91 
02.03.2015 City of Oslo 100 8 92 
08.07.2015 University of Warwick 100 13 87 
10.09.2015 University of California 100 10 90 
01.04.2016 Saudi Arabia 100 11 89 
13.12.2016 Southwark council pension fund 100 11 89 
15.05.2017 BMO Global Asset Management 100 8 92 
05.02.2018 Edinburgh University 100 6 94 
12.07.2018 Republic of Ireland 100 10 90 
09.03.2019 Norwegian Government Pension Fund 
Global 100 12 88 
07.05.2019 KLP 100 16 84 
  Total 1500 154 1346 
Note: Appendix 5 displays the date of the divestment announcement, the divesting institution, and the quantity 
of the sample of the top fossil fuel and renewable energy companies by market cap at the date of the 
announcement. Each event starts with 100 initial stocks. The exclusions column presents the number of 
observations removed due to missing data, and the final sample column presents the number of stocks that the 
analysis is conducted on. 
 
 
Appendix 6: Histogram fossil fuel returns 
 





Appendix 7: Histogram renewable energy returns 
 
Note: Appendix 7 shows the distribution of abnormal returns for renewable energy stocks.  
Appendix 8: Histogram fossil fuel volume 
 
Note: Appendix 8 shows the distribution of abnormal trading volume for fossil fuel stocks. 
Appendix 9: Histogram renewable energy volume 
 







Appendix 10: AAR - Fossil fuel stocks 
Event day AAR (%) T-stat 
-3 0.042 % 0.152 
-2 -0.136 % -0.489 
-1 0.138 % 0.494 
0 -0.173 % -0.623 
1 -0.293 % -1.054 
2 -0.106 % -0.379 
3 -0.126 % -0.452 
4 -0.153 % -0.549 
5 0.160 % 0.575 
6 -0.006 % -0.023 
7 0.086 % 0.310 
8 -0.359 % -1.289 
9 0.030 % 0.109 
10 -0.323 % -1.158 
Note: Appendix 10 presents the average abnormal return (AAR) for fossil fuel stocks and their respective T-
statistic. Significance levels: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
Appendix 11: AAR - Renewable energy stocks 
Event day AAR (%) T-stat 
-3 0.000 % -0.001 
-2 -0.467 % -1.185 
-1 0.031 % 0.078 
0 -0.631 % -1.603 
1 0.000 % 0.001 
2 0.020 % 0.051 
3 0.039 % 0.098 
4 0.324 % 0.822 
5 -0.124 % -0.316 
6 -0.205 % -0.521 
7 0.062 % 0.158 
8 0.380 % 0.964 
9 -0.049 % -0.124 
10 -0.225 % -0.571 
Note: Appendix 11 presents the average abnormal return for renewable energy stocks and their respective T-





Appendix 12: CAAR - Fossil fuel stocks 
Event window CAAR (%) T-stat 
Pre-event 0.043 % 0.089 
Short window -0.701 % -1.258 
Long window -1.269 % -1.374 
Full window -1.226 % -1.177 
Note: Appendix 12 presents the cumulative average abnormal return for fossil fuel stocks and their respective T-
statistic Significance levels: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Appendix 13: CAAR -  Renewable energy stocks 
Event window CAAR (%) T-stat 
Pre-event -0.436 % -0.640 
Short window -0.572 % -0.727 
Long window -0.410 % -0.314 
Full window -0.847 % -0.574 
Note: Appendix 13 presents the cumulative average abnormal return for renewable energy stocks and their 
respective T-statistic. Significance levels: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
 
Appendix 14: AAR - Renewable energy stocks aggregated by region 
Event day 
North America Asia/Oceania Europe 
AAR T-stat AAR T-stat AAR T-stat 
-3 0.183 % 0.228 -0.149 % -0.296 0.234 % 0.240 
-2 -1.013 % -1.263 -0.308 % -0.610 -0.055 % -0.057 
-1 0.123 % 0.153 0.025 % 0.050 -0.073 % -0.075 
0 -0.145 % -0.180 -0.972 % -1,926* -0.177 % -0.182 
1 -0.500 % -0.623 0.195 % 0.387 0.176 % 0.181 
2 -0.183 % -0.228 0.129 % 0.255 -0.054 % -0.056 
3 -0.116 % -0.145 0.235 % 0.467 -0.428 % -0.439 
4 0.670 % 0.835 0.294 % 0.583 -0.226 % -0.231 
5 -0.295 % -0.368 0.016 % 0.032 -0.343 % -0.352 
6 0.023 % 0.028 -0.333 % -0.660 -0.108 % -0.110 
7 -0.702 % -0.875 0.323 % 0.640 0.499 % 0.512 
8 0.043 % 0.053 0.621 % 1.231 0.081 % 0.083 
9 -0.476 % -0.594 0.020 % 0.039 0.517 % 0.530 
10 -0.633 % -0.789 -0.087 % -0.173 0.007 % 0.007 
Note: Appendix 14 presents the average abnormal return of renewable energy stocks during the full event window 
of three days prior to the event through ten days after the event, aggregated by the region of the exchange the 






Appendix 15: Fossil fuel stocks by region 
Region Number of stocks % 
North America 708 48 % 
Asia/Oceania 370 25 % 
Europe 320 22 % 
South America 66 5 % 
Total 1464 100 % 
Note: Appendix 16 presents the number of fossil fuel stocks included in the sample by the region of the stock 
exchange they are listed in, as well as the respective percentages of stocks in the sample listed in each region. 
Appendix 16: Renewable energy stocks by region 
Region Number of stocks % 
Asia/Oceania 759 56 % 
North America 383 28 % 
Europe 204 15 % 
South America 0 0 % 
Total 1346 100 % 
Note: Appendix 16 presents the number of renewable energy stocks included in the sample by the region of the 


















Appendix 17: Fossil fuel stocks included in the study 
Stock Frequency % of events 
Exxon Mobil Corp 15 100 % 
Royal Dutch Shell PLC 15 100 % 
PetroChina Co Ltd 15 100 % 
Chevron Corp 15 100 % 
Total SE 15 100 % 
BP PLC 15 100 % 
Schlumberger NV 15 100 % 
China Petroleum & Chemical Corp 15 100 % 
Eni SpA 15 100 % 
Equinor ASA 15 100 % 
Petroleo Brasileiro SA Petrobras 15 100 % 
ConocoPhillips 15 100 % 
Gazprom PAO 15 100 % 
Ecopetrol SA 15 100 % 
CNOOC Ltd 15 100 % 
Occidental Petroleum Corp 15 100 % 
NK Rosneft' PAO 15 100 % 
Enterprise Products Partners LP 15 100 % 
Glencore PLC 15 100 % 
EOG Resources Inc 15 100 % 
Suncor Energy Inc 15 100 % 
Halliburton Co 15 100 % 
China Shenhua Energy Co Ltd 15 100 % 
Reliance Industries Ltd 15 100 % 
Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd 15 100 % 
Phillips 66 15 100 % 
Canadian Natural Resources Ltd 15 100 % 
NK Lukoil PAO 15 100 % 
Imperial Oil Ltd 15 100 % 
Enbridge Inc 15 100 % 
Kinder Morgan Inc 15 100 % 
TC Energy Corp 15 100 % 
APA Corp (US) 15 100 % 
Coal India Ltd 15 100 % 
Repsol SA 15 100 % 
Woodside Petroleum Ltd 15 100 % 
Nov Inc 15 100 % 
Novatek PAO 15 100 % 
Williams Companies Inc 15 100 % 
Valero Energy Corp 15 100 % 





Devon Energy Corp 15 100 % 
Energy Transfer LP 15 100 % 
Pioneer Natural Resources Co 15 100 % 
Surgutneftegaz PAO 15 100 % 
Tenaris SA 15 100 % 
Marathon Petroleum Corp 15 100 % 
Marathon Oil Corp 15 100 % 
Formosa Petrochemical Corp 15 100 % 
Hess Corp 15 100 % 
Continental Resources Inc 15 100 % 
Plains All American Pipeline LP 15 100 % 
Baker Hughes Co 15 100 % 
PTT Exploration and Production PCL 15 100 % 
Gazprom Neft' PAO 15 100 % 
Magellan Midstream Partners LP 15 100 % 
Snam SpA 15 100 % 
Empresas Copec SA 15 100 % 
OMV AG 15 100 % 
Galp Energia SGPS SA 15 100 % 
Tatneft' PAO 15 100 % 
Cabot Oil & Gas Corp 15 100 % 
Cheniere Energy Inc 15 100 % 
Pembina Pipeline Corp 15 100 % 
Eneos Holdings Inc 15 100 % 
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd 15 100 % 
Cheniere Energy Partners LP 15 100 % 
Oil Search Ltd 15 100 % 
Cenovus Energy Inc 14 93 % 
Inpex Corp 14 93 % 
ONEOK Inc 14 93 % 
SK Innovation Co Ltd 14 93 % 
Icahn Enterprises LP 14 93 % 
Western Midstream Partners LP 14 93 % 
China Coal Energy Co Ltd 14 93 % 
Polskie Gornictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo SA 14 93 % 
Cimarex Energy Co 13 87 % 
SK Holdings Co Ltd 13 87 % 
Plains GP Holdings LP 12 80 % 
YPF SA 12 80 % 
China Oilfield Services Ltd 12 80 % 
Yanzhou Coal Mining Co Ltd 12 80 % 
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd 12 80 % 
Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Co Ltd 12 80 % 





HollyFrontier Corp 11 73 % 
Shaanxi Coal Industry Co Ltd 10 67 % 
Crescent Point Energy Corp 9 60 % 
Inter Pipeline Ltd 9 60 % 
S-Oil Corp 9 60 % 
Polski Koncern Naftowy Orlen SA 9 60 % 
Antero Resources Corp 8 53 % 
Range Resources Corp 8 53 % 
Oil and Gas Development Co Ltd 8 53 % 
Helmerich and Payne Inc 8 53 % 
Neste Oyj 8 53 % 
Southwestern Energy Co 7 47 % 
Murphy Oil Corp 7 47 % 
Ultrapar Participacoes SA 7 47 % 
DCC PLC 7 47 % 
MPLX LP 7 47 % 
Santos Ltd 6 40 % 
ANK Bashneft' PAO 5 33 % 
Enagas SA 5 33 % 
Targa Resources Corp 5 33 % 
Diamondback Energy Inc 5 33 % 
Valaris PLC 4 27 % 
Ampol Ltd 4 27 % 
Aker BP ASA 4 27 % 
Transocean Ltd 3 20 % 
Tullow Oil PLC 3 20 % 
Saipem SpA 3 20 % 
Tourmaline Oil Corp 3 20 % 
EQT Corp 3 20 % 
Koninklijke Vopak NV 3 20 % 
TechnipFMC PLC 3 20 % 
United Tractors Tbk PT 3 20 % 
Lundin Energy AB 3 20 % 
ARC Resources Ltd 2 13 % 
Petronas Dagangan Bhd 2 13 % 
Offshore Oil Engineering Co Ltd 2 13 % 
Hindustan Petroleum Corp Ltd 2 13 % 
Abu Dhabi National Oil Company for Distribution PJSC 2 13 % 
Idemitsu Kosan Co Ltd 2 13 % 
San Miguel Corp 2 13 % 
Petrovietnam Gas Joint Stock Corp 2 13 % 
Sinopec Oilfield Service Corp 2 13 % 
Enable Midstream Partners LP 1 7 % 





Whiting Petroleum Corp 1 7 % 
Yantai Jereh Oilfield Services Group Co Ltd 1 7 % 
SUNDANCE ENERGY INC (US) 1 7 % 
Antarchile SA 1 7 % 
MOL Magyar Olajes Gazipari Nyrt 1 7 % 
Petrobras Distribuidora SA 1 7 % 
Note: Appendix 17 presents the fossil fuel stocks included in the study. The frequency represents the number of 
times the respective stock is included in the sample of the top 100 fossil fuel firms, as ranked by market cap, at 
the date of a divestment announcement. The percentage of events represents the percent of divestment 
announcement events in this study in which this stock is included in the sample. 
 
 
Appendix 18: Renewable energy stocks included in the study 
Stock Frequency % of events 
Vestas Wind Systems A/S 15 100 % 
Daqo New Energy Corp 15 100 % 
First Solar Inc 15 100 % 
GCL-Poly Energy Holdings Ltd 15 100 % 
Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co Ltd 15 100 % 
JinkoSolar Holding Co Ltd 15 100 % 
Hanwha Solutions Corp 15 100 % 
SunPower Corp 15 100 % 
Guodian Technology & Environment Group Corp Ltd 15 100 % 
Sungrow Power Supply Co Ltd 15 100 % 
Nanfang Ventilator Co Ltd 15 100 % 
Canadian Solar Inc 15 100 % 
China High Speed Transmission Equipment Group Co Ltd 15 100 % 
Gigasolar Materials Corp 15 100 % 
Tongwei Co Ltd 15 100 % 
Xiangtan Electric Manufacturing Co Ltd 15 100 % 
United Renewable Energy Co Ltd 15 100 % 
Titan Wind Energy Suzhou Co Ltd 15 100 % 
Solareast Holdings Co Ltd 15 100 % 
EGing Photovoltaic Technology Co Ltd 15 100 % 
Risen Energy Co Ltd 15 100 % 
Green Plains Inc 15 100 % 
Jiangsu SINOJIT Wind Energy Technology Co Ltd 15 100 % 
Shenzhen Topraysolar Co Ltd 15 100 % 
Huayi Electric Co Ltd 15 100 % 
Shanghai Taisheng Wind Power Equipment Co Ltd 15 100 % 
Plug Power Inc 15 100 % 





North Electro-Optic Co Ltd 15 100 % 
Jiangsu Akcome Science & Technology Co Ltd 15 100 % 
CropEnergies AG 15 100 % 
FutureFuel Corp 15 100 % 
Sanix Inc 15 100 % 
Changzhou Almaden Co Ltd 15 100 % 
Guangzhou Devotion Thermal Technology Co Ltd 15 100 % 
REX American Resources Corp 15 100 % 
Suzlon Energy Ltd 15 100 % 
Renewable Energy Group Inc 15 100 % 
GCL System Integration Technology Co Ltd 15 100 % 
Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy SA 15 100 % 
Fuelcell Energy Inc 15 100 % 
Kenergy Scientific Inc 15 100 % 
ABCO Energy Inc 15 100 % 
Qingdao Zhongzi Zhongcheng Group Co Ltd 15 100 % 
Velocys PLC 15 100 % 
Roxas Holdings Inc 15 100 % 
Cardinal Ethanol LLC 15 100 % 
Unison Co Ltd 15 100 % 
ForceField Energy Inc 15 100 % 
Ceres Power Holdings PLC 15 100 % 
Ballard Power Systems Inc 14 93 % 
JA Solar Technology Co Ltd 14 93 % 
Alto Ingredients Inc 14 93 % 
Tainergy Tech Co Ltd 14 93 % 
Broadwind Inc 14 93 % 
S-Energy Co Ltd 14 93 % 
Gevo Inc 14 93 % 
Ujaas Energy Ltd 14 93 % 
Ameresco Inc 13 87 % 
Verbio Vereinigte Bioenergie AG 13 87 % 
Danen Technology Corp 13 87 % 
algoWatt SpA 13 87 % 
West Holdings Corp 12 80 % 
Silex Systems Ltd 12 80 % 
Power Financial Group Ltd 12 80 % 
SolarWindow Technologies Inc 12 80 % 
SFC Energy AG 12 80 % 
Global Bioenergies SA 12 80 % 
BBHC Inc 12 80 % 
China Geothermal Industry Development Group Ltd 11 73 % 
Shinsung E&G Co Ltd 11 73 % 





JC Chemical Corp Ltd 11 73 % 
Granite Falls Energy LLC 11 73 % 
Enphase Energy Inc 10 67 % 
Solargiga Energy Holdings Ltd 10 67 % 
Tonking New Energy Group Holdings Ltd 10 67 % 
Northern Growers LLC 10 67 % 
Longitech Smart Energy Holding Ltd 9 60 % 
Thai Agro Energy PCL 9 60 % 
AFC Energy PLC 8 53 % 
Propellus Inc 8 53 % 
Red Trail Energy LLC 8 53 % 
Heron Lake BioEnergy LLC 8 53 % 
SIMEC Atlantis Energy Ltd 8 53 % 
Deinove SA 7 47 % 
Kirin Group Holdings Ltd 7 47 % 
Daehan Green Power Corp 7 47 % 
Vergnet SA 7 47 % 
Solartron PCL 6 40 % 
Zhongde Waste Technology AG 6 40 % 
Aemetis Inc 6 40 % 
Indosolar Ltd 6 40 % 
Jinlei Technology Co Ltd 6 40 % 
Inox Wind Ltd 6 40 % 
Senvion SA 6 40 % 
Engie Eps SA 6 40 % 
Shenwu Energy Saving Co Ltd 5 33 % 
Highwater Ethanol LLC 5 33 % 
Ideal Power Inc 5 33 % 
Kingbostrike Ltd 5 33 % 
Sunrun Inc 5 33 % 
Green Energy Group Ltd 5 33 % 
Grenergy Renovables SA 5 33 % 
Real Goods Solar Inc 4 27 % 
Quantum Materials Corp 4 27 % 
TPI Composites Inc 4 27 % 
Sif Holding NV 4 27 % 
Qingdao Tianneng Heavy Industries Co Ltd 4 27 % 
Martifer SGPS SA 3 20 % 
Surana Solar Ltd 3 20 % 
Nel ASA 3 20 % 
ABO-Group Environment NV 3 20 % 
Anji Technology Co Ltd 3 20 % 
Swedish Stirling AB 3 20 % 





MDI Energia SA 3 20 % 
First National Energy Corp 3 20 % 
Tarsier Ltd 2 13 % 
ITM Power PLC 2 13 % 
Ener-Core Inc 2 13 % 
Xinyi Solar Holdings Ltd 2 13 % 
Aqua Power Systems Inc 2 13 % 
NanoFlex Power Corp 2 13 % 
CS Wind Corp 2 13 % 
Sino Bioenergy Corp 2 13 % 
ABO Wind AG 2 13 % 
SPI Energy Co Ltd 2 13 % 
JiangSu Zhenjiang NewEnergy Equipment Co Ltd 2 13 % 
Pinnacle Renewable Energy Inc 2 13 % 
Sino United Worldwide Consolidated Ltd 2 13 % 
Advance Materials Corp 1 7 % 
Abalance Corp 1 7 % 
Solaredge Technologies Inc 1 7 % 
Global Green Chemicals PCL 1 7 % 
KOALA Financial Group Ltd 1 7 % 
Technovative Group Inc 1 7 % 
SolTech Energy Sweden AB 1 7 % 
Sky Energy Indonesia Tbk PT 1 7 % 
Cortus Energy AB 1 7 % 
China Network Media Inc 1 7 % 
Sunworks Inc 1 7 % 
Note: Appendix 18 presents the renewable energy stocks included in the study. The frequency represents the 
number of times the respective stock is included in the sample of the top 100 renewable energy firms, as ranked 
by market cap, at the date of a divestment announcement. The percentage of events represents the percent of 
divestment announcement events in this study in which this stock is included in the sample. 
